Mr. Pelker alleged the Federal Governments impermissible collusion within the prosecution of the Commonwealth.of Pennsylvania for the same misconduct underlying his federal indictment violated Mr. Pelker 1s substantive constitutional right to be free from arbitrary governmental actions in contravention of the fundamental constitutional principles of Federalism, Separation of Powers, Equal Protection, Fundamental Fairness, Abuse of Process, and several procedural due process protections under state law. Additionally, Mr. Pelker alleged that said claim addressed issues outside of the trial record and legal rights outside the federal jurisdiction. Thus 28 U.S.C. §2255 was the appropriate proceeding to litigate said claim. However, Mr. Pelker also alleged that if the Court held said claim was procedurally defaulted, Mr. Pelker asserted appellate counsel John A. Abom, Esquire, ineffectiveness in this regard established the essential "cause" and "prejudice" to excuse said default.

Did the Third Circuit Court of Appeals err in denying Mr. Pelker a Certificate of Appealability (herein referred to as a "COA") by relying upon the District Courts erroneous decision that Mr. Pelker procedurally defaulted his claim of the Federal Governments unconstitutional collusion in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania's prosecution by failing to raise said claim within his direct appeal and the courts determination that said claim lacked merit?

Mr. Pelker also alleged that prior counsel Jeffrey A. Conrad, Esquire, rendered per se ineffective assistance of counsel for having two (2) actual conflicts of interest while representing Mr. Pelker during his federal criminal proceedings. Initially, counsel adopted and acted upon his belief that Mr. Pelker should had been convicted of the charged misconduct. Neither the District Court nor the Third Circuit Court of Appeals addressed said issue. Lastly, counsel was campaigning and seeking employment as a judge in Lancaster County, Pennsylvania; without obtaining Mr. Pelker's informed consent. However, Mr. Pelker also alleged that even if the Court determined that no conflict of interest existed, Mr. Pelker was able to demonstrate ineffectiveness in regard to Mr. Conrad's representation pursuant to the traditional Strickland standard, both for coercing his guilty plea and his self incriminating proffer which was not in his best interest.

Did the Third Circuit Court of Appeals err in denying Mr. Pelker a COA by relying upon the District Courts erroneous decision that Mr. Pelker was unable to establish prejudice in regard to Mr. Conrad 's ineffectiveness for maintaining representation of Mr. Pelker despite having two (2) actual conflicts of interests; (1) of which both courts failed to address, and imploring/coercing a third-party; who was cooperating with the Federal Government and of interest for a violation of a federal law to was a person coerce Mr. Pelker into pleading guilty and provide a self incriminating proffer?

Lastly, Mr. Pelker alleged that his constitutional right to file a Petition for Writ of Certiorari with the United States Supreme Court from the denial of his direct appeal by the Third Circuit Court of Appeals should had been reinstated due to Mr. Pelker's inaction in this regard being solely from the interference the global pandemic had on his access to the institutional law library and his constitutional right to access to the Court in regard to filing said petition.

Did the Third Circuit Court of Appeals err in denying Mr. Pelker a COA by relying upon the District Courts erroneous decision that Mr. Pelker*s alleged "proficiency*' of law

Question not identified