Does the Religious Freedom Restoration Act ("RFRA" ) and its compelling
government interest/least restrictive means-test apply to protect a
federal inmate's religious liberties when she has adequately pleaded a
substantial burden on the practice of her Christian faith, or is RFRA-
protection eviscerated if a court finds that defendant-jailers ' act
ions are reasonably related to legitimate penological interests?

II. Does qualified immunity shield rogue government officials from person
al liability under RFRA or the First Amendment for taking away a prisonChristian self-authored writings, because there is no case directly
on point, or is her constitutional and statutory right to write so
clearly established and her "freedom of opinion and its expression . .
. too certain to need discussion [,]" Mutual Film Corp. v. Industrial
Com. , 236 U.S. 230, 243 (1915), when the defendants' conduct serves
no legitimate penological purpose and its own policy permits inmates
to write?

III. Is Ms. Biron's First Amendment or RFRA injunctive relief claim for
the return of her property (144-pages of Christian writings authored
by her) moot because the writing was taken by the defendants at a
different federal Bureau of Prisons facility from where she resides
now, or is the claim still viable because the federal Bureau of Pri
sons is a single national prison system and the defendants at the
prior facility remain in wrongful possession of her property and re
fuse to give it back?

IV. Does an appellate court get to decide in the first instance, as the
Fifth Circuit panel-majority has done, that the defendants did not
substantially burden the practice of Ms. Biron's faith by halting
her God-given writing assignment; and what is a "substantial burden"
on religious exercise in the federal prison context?

Does the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) apply to protect a federal inmate's religious liberties when she has adequately pleaded a substantial burden on the practice of her Christian faith, or is RFRA protection eviscerated if a court finds that defendant-jailers' actions are reasonably related to legitimate penological interests?