1) Did the Petitioner's Letter to the District Court Clerk, which stated:
"5:19-Cr~136-DCR
Dear Court Clerk
I received the decision from the court today. [Record No. 68] I did
receive a service copy of the governments response [Record No. 65] Please,
send me a copy of the government's response for appeal purposes
Rakim Moberly
USP Lompoc
8901 Klein Blvd
Lompoc, CA 93436;"
qualify as a Notice of Appeal, pursuant to Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure,
Rule 3?6/30/22
not
# 22784-032

2)If the Petitioner's Letter should have been determined to act as a Notice
of Appeal; and was received by the District Court Clerk, within 14-days of the
District Court's final order, was it timely filed, pursuant to Federal Rules of
Appellate Procedure, Rules 4(b) and 4(c)?

3) Was the District Court and Court of Appeals justified in dismissing the Petitioner's
as untimely, pursuant to a Motion to Dismiss from the Respondent, without assessing
the standards identified in Pioneer Investment Services Co. v. Brunswick Associates
Limited Partnership , 507 U.S. 380 (1993); and Stutson v. United States . 516 U.S.
193 (1996)?

4) Does the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals' standard for "excusable neglect,"
as set forth in its circuit precedent: Proctor v. Northern Lakes Community Mental .
Health , 560 Fed. Appx. 453, 458 (6th Cir. 2014) that "ignorance of the rules or
mistakes in construing the rules do not usually constitute excusable neglect,"
limits and misinterprets the scope of this Court's interpretation of "excusable
negleqt," as it pertains to pro se criminal defendants, rather than attorneys?

5) If the Petitioner made a timely Notice of Appeal, would the lower courts be
required to review his Compassionate Release/Reduction in Sentence Motion under
this Court's standards, announced in Concepcion v. United States. (No. 20-1650)
142 S. Ct. 2389, 213 L.Ed 2d 731 (2022), United States v. Carter. 44 F.4th 1227
(9th Cir. 2022) (noting that Concepcion abrogated United States v. Kelley , 962 F.3d
470, 475 (9th Cir. 2020), which had held that the First Step Act did not authorize
a district court to consider post-conviction legal changes outside of Sections
2 and 3 of the Fair Sentencing Act)?

Whether the petitioner's letter to the district court clerk qualified as a notice of appeal