Question 1. Is there sufficient overall disarray in post-Exxon Rooker-Feldman jurisprudence, including inter- and intra-Circuit conflicts and disharmony, and disagreements among Circuit judges as expressed in dissenting and/or concurring opinions, to warrant this Court's attention to clarify the scope and contours of Rooker-Feldman?

Question 2a. When a federal plaintiff alleges merely an "injur[y] caused by [a] ... judgment[]" (in the sense of Exxon, 284), does the plaintiff therefore fail to plead injury in fact (since one has no legally-protected interest in having a favorable decision)?

Question 2b. Is Rooker-Feldman subsumed under injury-in-fact jurisprudence, and therefore superfluous?

Question 2c. Should this Court formally abolish Rooker-Feldman altogether (since resolution of the injury-in-fact inquiry necessarily resolves the Rooker-Feldman inquiry)?

Question 3a. Did Feldman wrongly decide Feldman's Count 5?

Question 3b. In Feldman's Count 5, was Feldman's alleged injury caused by the State-Court decision, or was Feldman's alleged injury the denial of his constitutional rights, caused by the State Court's discriminatory refusal to consider Feldman's qualifications?

Question 3c. If the injury alleged in Feldman's Count 5 was the unconstitutional, discriminatory refusal to consider Feldman's qualifications (not the State-Court decision), was Feldman's treatment of Feldman's Count 5 erroneous in light of Exxon?

Question 3d. Did Feldman's discussion of Feldman's Count 5 misstate Feldman's Count 5 by asserting, "[Feldman] alleg[ed] that the [State Court] ... acted ... discriminatorily in denying [Feldman's] petition]]," when in actuality Feldman alleged that the State Court acted discriminatorily in refusing to consider his qualifications? Compare Feldman, 486-487 (emphasis added), with Id., 469, n. 3 (emphasis added).

Question 3e. Did Exxon ever discuss Feldman's Count 5?

Question 3f. Should this Court partially overturn Feldman for erroneously barring Feldman's Count 5?

Question 4a. Since federal district courts, while exercising original jurisdiction under Rule 60(b), can reopen federal-district-court judgments to accomplish justice and secure due process rights, does it follow that federal district courts likewise have original jurisdiction to reopen state-court judgments to accomplish justice and secure due process rights?

Question 4b. If the answer to the foregoing is, "No,"

Is there sufficient disarray in post-Exxon Rooker-Feldman jurisprudence to warrant clarification?