To secure Ray Dansby's conviction and death sentence, the State relied heavily on the testimony of a jailhouse informant to whom Dansby purportedly confessed. The informant told the jury a highly aggravated and uncorroborated version of the crime. When the informant approached the police with his story, he had felony charges pending—indeed, he was jailed on those charges because he had refused to help the police apprehend another suspect. He went free shortly after informing on Dansby. At the time of Dansby's trial, the felony charges remained unresolved, and the informant remained free on bond. In the months before Dansby's trial, police picked up the informant twice—once for stabbing a bar patron. The informant was nonetheless allowed to remain free. The trial court precluded Dansby from cross-examining the informant about these matters or from introducing materials that would establish the informant's favorable treatment after his arrests.

The questions presented are:

1. Whether preclusion of cross-examination about an informant's propensity for bias violates the Confrontation Clause.

2. Whether the Confrontation Clause entitles a criminal defendant to introduce extrinsic evidence to impeach a witness for bias.

3. Whether a state court adjudicates a federal constitutional claim on the merits when it cites no federal constitutional provision, no state constitutional provision parallel to the federal constitutional provision, and no case that interprets the federal constitutional provision.

Whether preclusion of cross-examination about an informant's propensity for bias violates the Confrontation Clause