I. Whether the Sixth Circuit's ruling merits
summary reversal where the court found constitutional error but deemed it harmless under the far less
searching preponderance-of-the-evidence standard applied to non-constitutional errors.

II. When a district court erroneously refuses to
instruct the jury about the effect of the statute of limitations in a criminal trial, is the proper remedy on direct review of a conviction:

(1) to reverse for a new trial unless the error

is deemed harmless in accordance with the

"beyond a reasonable doubt" standard of

Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967) (the

rule suggested by this Court's precedent but

not yet applied in any circuit court),

(2) to presume prejudice, reverse the convic
tion, and conduct a new trial (the rule in the

Fifth, Eleventh, and D.C. Circuits), or

(3) to reverse for a new trial unless the error

is deemed harmless in accordance with the

preponderance-of-the-evidence standard gov
erning non-constitutional errors (the rule in

the Sixth Circuit)?

whether-the-sixth-circuit's-ruling-merits-summary-reversal