Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death
Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), a state prisoner
petitioning for federal habeas relief ordinarily must
demonstrate either that the state court unreasonably
determined facts in light of the evidence, or, as
relevant here, that the state court's decision "was
contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application
of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by
[this Court]". 28 U.S.C. §§ 2254(d)(1), (d)(2).

Here, relying on this Court's decision in Parker v.
Matthews, 567 U.S. 37 (2012), and in conflict with the
Second Circuit and at least in tension with several
other circuits, the Sixth Circuit concluded that it could
not consider its own prior precedent in determining
whether a state court decision constitutes an
"unreasonable application" of Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), and its progeny.

The question presented is whether Section
2254(d)(1) prohibits lower federal courts from
considering precedent from courts other than this
Court in determining whether a state court's
application of clearly established Federal law was
unreasonable.

Whether Section 2254(d)(1) prohibits lower federal courts from considering precedent from courts other than the Supreme Court in determining whether a state court's application of clearly established Federal law was unreasonable