On Petitioner's second direct appeal, in resolving Petitioner's sufficiency of evidence claim regarding the existence of a single statutory aggravating factor that extended his sentence beyond the statutory maximum sentence that could be imposed, Illinois Appellate Court interpreted the "general verdict form" evidence used to prove the existence of the aggravating factor, to reflect conclusions of matters of facts determined on Petitioner's first direct appeal, an interpretation that invaded the province of the jury and effectively relieved the State of its burden of proving the existence of the aggravating factor "anew", a novel interpretation that is contrary to Illinois Statutes and more than 30 years of Illinois Supreme Court's decisions interpreting the Statutes involved, in order to salvage the natural life sentence imposed on Petitioner:

I.) WHETHER, IN DOING SO, THE COURT'S RESOLUTION REPRESENTS AN UNFORESEEABLE AND RETROACTIVE JUDICIAL EXPANSION OF NARROW AND PRECISE STATUTORY LANGUAGE THAT DENIED PETITIONER DUE PROCESS-FAIR WARNING?

II.) WHETHER, IN DOING SO, THE COURT RE-WEIGHED THE "GENERAL VERDICT FORM" EVIDENCE IN A MANNER THAT DENIED PETITIONER DUE PROCESS-LIBERTY INTEREST IN HAVING THE JURY MAKE PARTICULAR FINDINGS OF THE AGGRAVATING FACTOR BASED ON REASONABLE EVIDENCE?

III.) WHETHER THE COURT DENIED PETITIONER ADEQUATE ACCESS TO THE COURT, HIS DUE PROCESS RIGHT TO BE HEARD ON HIS SUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE CLAIM WHEN IT RULED PETITIONER COULD NOT CHALLENGE THE SUFFICIENCY OF THE "GENERAL VERDICT FORM" EVIDENCE USED TO PROVE THE EXISTENCE OF THE STATUTORY AGGRAVATING FACTOR TO MAKE HIM ELIGIBLE FOR A NATURAL LIFE SENTENCE?

Whether the court's resolution represents an unforeseeable and retroactive judicial expansion of narrow and precise statutory language that denied petitioner due process-fair warning