I, WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AND ERRED WHEN IT HELD THAT THE DISTRICT COURT'S FAILURE TO ADJUDICATE LAYMAN'S PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS WAS AN ADEQUATE MEANS FOR OBTAINING RELIEF FOR BEING CHARGED WITH HOMICIDE FOR A MEDICAL MISCARRIAGE WHICH IS NOT A CRIME?

II, WHETHER HABEAS RELIEF SHOULD BE GRANTED TO LAYMAN WHO WAS DENIED DUE PROCESS:

1, WAS COERCED INTO A GUILTY PLEA FOR MANSLAUGHTER FOLLOWING HER MISCARRIAGE FOR MEDICAL REASONS,

2, WAS CONVICTED OF HOMICIDE FOR HAVING A MISCARRIAGE,

3, WAS VICTIMIZED BY TWO GOVERNMENT MEDICAL DOCTORS WHO DISHONESTLY DESCRIBED A MISCARRIAGE AS "HOMICIDE",

4, WHO UNDER NEW YORK STATE LAW CAN HAVE AN ABORTION UP TO FULL TERM OF PREGNANCY,

5, WHO UNDER NEW YORK LAW HAS FULL AUTHORITY OVER HER PREGNANCY, INCLUDING CONFIDENTAILITY,

6, WHO WAS DENIED A DUE PROCESS SPEEDY TRIAL FOLLOWING THE GOVERNOR'S SUSPENSION OF DUE PROCESS FOR SIX MONTHS,

7, WHO WAS DENIED A DUE PROCESS SPEEDY TRIAL AS THE GOVERNMENT COULD NEVER BE READY FOR TRIAL USING FALSE EVIDENCE THAT MISCARRIAGE WAS A HOMICIDE?

Whether the lower court erred in its interpretation and application of the relevant civil-rights, due-process, and equal-protection laws