The majority of federal statutes require a defendant to act "knowingly"
to incur criminal liability, meaning that the defendant must have actual
knowledge of some relevant fact. Courts have developed a common-law
alternative to actual knowledge called "willful blindness." As the Court
explained in Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., 563 U.S. 754, 769
(2011), a defendant may be deemed to have knowledge, even in the absence of
actual knowledge, where "(1) [t]he defendant [] subjectively believe[s] that
there is a high probability that a fact exists and (2) the defendant [] take[s]
deliberate actions to avoid learning of that fact." Willful blindness "surpasses
recklessness and negligence," encompassing only those "who can almost be said
to have actually known the critical facts." Id.

Nonetheless, the circuits remain divided over when "willful blindness"
can be used to establish knowledge. The question presented is whether
"knowing" federal criminal liability based on "willful blindness" requires a
defendant to "subjectively" believe there is a "high probability" of a fact and
take "deliberate actions" to avoid learning that fact—as this Court opined in
Global-Tech and as several circuits hold—or whether it merely requires the
defendant to "fail[] to question" "suspicious circumstances," as the Second
Circuit holds.

Whether 'knowing' federal criminal liability based on 'willful blindness' requires a defendant to 'subjectively' believe there is a 'high probability' of a fact and take 'deliberate actions' to avoid learning that fact, or merely requires the defendant to 'fail[] to question' 'suspicious circumstances'