(1) Whether Petitioner Lewis habeas petition should be re-opened where Petitioner was denied Due Process of Law contrary to United States v. Castro, 540 U.S. 375 (2003), because Petitioner was not placed on notice of the consequences of deleting unexhausted claims, and (2) the United States District Court Judge erred in deciding exhaustion on one of Petitioner's ineffective assistance of counsel claims contrary to Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).

Does the time limitation of Federal Rule Civil Procedure 60(c)(1), preclude relief from judgment under Rule 60(b)(6), where a Castro claim is involved in the responsive pleadings on exhaustion grounds?

Can a conditional statement be considered a waiver of Due Process of Notice, where Rosa v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509 (1982), and United States v. Castro, 540 U.S. 375 (2003), require Due Process of Notice?

Whether Petitioner Lewis' habaas petition should be re-opened