A law enforcement officer's use of deadly force in
self-defense is not constitutionally unreasonable. Courts
throughout the nation universally agree that deadly
force is justified under the Fourth Amendment when a
reasonable officer has probable cause to believe there
is a threat of serious physical harm to themselves or to
others. The question presented is whether a jury
should be instructed on this core principle of law. In the
decision below, the district court gave a standard Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989), instruction on
reasonableness of non-deadly force that was affirmed
on appeal after the Eleventh Circuit concluded the
Graham factors outlined in its standard jury instruction accurately stated the law on reasonableness for all
excessive force cases. The Eleventh Circuit's one-sizefits-all approach to the question of deadly force conflicts with the prevailing law of this Court in Tennessee
v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985), and with that of other circuits. Resolution of this conflict is essential to unify the
law on this vitally important public policy question.

The specific questions presented are:

Does the reasonableness of deadly force in
self-defense turn on whether the officer had
probable cause to believe there was a threat
of serious physical harm to a law enforcement
officer or to others?

Does a jury instruction on Graham v. Connor
accurately state the law regarding the reasonableness of deadly force in self-defense?

Whether a jury should be instructed on the core principle that a law enforcement officer's use of deadly force in self-defense is not constitutionally unreasonable when the officer has probable cause to believe there is a threat of serious physical harm