1) SIXTH AMENDMENT SPEEDY TRIAL: Did the Tenth Circuit fundamentally
err in its application of Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 513, 531-36
(1972); when it attributed delay to the defense for time it took
to discover, litigate, and prove government "tactical delay" and
a bad-faith, delay-linked "pattern of widespread and continuous
miscondcut" that "fundamentally compromised" the case; and also
when it failed adequately to account for delay-linked Fifth and
Sixth Amendment violations that "undermine[d]" the possibility of
a fair trial? More concisely:

* Under Barker, does the time it takes the defense to prove
government delay and prejudice, weigh against the defendant?

* Can a court apply the substance of the rejected "demandwaiver" rule and weigh the third Barker factor (a
defendant's assertion of the speedy trial right) against the
defense, and thereby excuse bad-faith government delay and
prejudice, if the assertion of the right is not made
pre-emptively?

* Under Barker, can undisputed trial perjudice caused directly
by bad-faith, delay-linked government conduct be mitigated
by a-court's generalized, non-specific periods of defense
caused delay?

2) SPEEDY TRIAL ACT: Under 18 U.S.C. § 3162(a)(2) and United States
v. Taylor, 487 U.S. 326, 338-39 (1988): After a district court
has ruled that a criminal trial will be unfair as a result of
bad-faith, delay-linked government misconduct; can the
"seriousness 'of the offense" factor - alone - justify allowing
the unfair trial?

3) STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS: Did the Tenth Circuit err when it expanded
the scope of 18 U.S.C. § 3288, creating a new, second sixth-month
grace. period to allow the government the ability to re-indict
following a dismissal, appeal, and the dismissal becoming final;
despite the text of the statute which limits this time-period
to "60-days"?

4) ISSUE PRECLUSION: Did the Tenth Circuit err when it created a
circuit split; rejecting the standard set forth in the Restatement
(Second) of Judgments, § 13, by announcing that a fully and °
fairly litigated suppression order cannot constitute a final
judgment of issues for preclusion purposes? More concisely:

* Is a fully and fairly litigated suppression order a
"final judgment" of issues, enforcable under the federal
doctrine of issue preclusion?

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