1. The "demanding standard" of proof the Panel
imposed on petitioner to show waiver of a contract
condition under Illinois law has no foundation in
that State's jurisprudence. The Panel's version
denies relief if just one fact is inconsistent with
waiver while Illinois law provides relief even when
some facts are inconsistent with waiver. Did the
Panel's unsupported standard unfairly deprive
petitioner of his ability to show a triable fact issue
whether respondent waived a contract condition
and so skewed summary judgment as to deny him
due process of law?

2. Does the Panel's misreading of Illinois law in
exercising its supplemental jurisdiction to impose
upon petitioner a more onerous burden of proving
waiver than Illinois law requires violate the
federalism principles of Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins,
304 U.S. 64 (1938), causing a substantial variation
in outcomes between State and federal litigation,
influencing the choice of a forum for future
litigants and depriving petitioner of property
rights he otherwise enjoys in State court?

3. Did the court of appeals irredeemably mishandle
the summary judgment record by refusing to view
the reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in the
light most favorable to petitioner, the nonmoving
party, when assessing his claim that after engaging
in protected activity, he was discharged because of
his protected activity?

Whether the panel imposed an unsupported standard of proof for waiver under Illinois law, depriving the petitioner of due process