Did the extrinsic fraud which deprived Hooper of knowing of the existence of, and effectively having access to, the recordings of his police interrogation, — which were guaranteed to him by procedural rules — deprived him of the opportunity to mount a meaningful defense under the right to due process?

Was the restricted examination, limited to only to its (intrinsic) trial record, by the circuit court regarding Hoglan's claims of extrinsic fraud' sufficient enough to make a factual determination on whether or not extrinsic fraud had occurred outside the intrinsic safeguard mechanisms of the court's proceedings and its record, and had it had tainted Hooper's due process?

Does the extrinsic fraud in question nullify Hooper's commitment into a plea agreement because he did not voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently waive his opportunity to continue on with the proceedings armed with the recordings?

Did the extrinsic-fraud deprive-Hooper-of-due-process