When government officials seek to rely upon consent to justify the lawfulness of a search or seizure, the burden is on them to show by clear and positive evidence that the consent was freely, voluntarily and knowledgeably given. Where the consent is obtained through a misrepresentation by the government, such consent is not voluntary. Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, 548 (1968). It is also the government's burden to show the warrantless search or seizure was within the scope of the consent given. Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500 (1983); Lo-Ji Sales, Inc. v. New York, 442 U.S. 319, 329 (1979).

The questions presented are:

a. When a crime victim possesses only particular messages on her cell phone related to the reported offense and agrees to permit a detective to download those messages, what is the scope of the victim's consent and does that consent extend to a digital duplication of all data contained on that cell phone?

b. Where a crime victim is not informed that a digital duplication of all data contained on her cell phone would be made and retained by law enforcement indefinitely does she voluntarily give her phone to law enforcement when her initial sole purpose is to permit law enforcement to download particular messages identified during the interview between the victim and detective?

c. Where the government fails to provide the original waiver for forensic examination upon demand and the cell phone owner denies signing any waiver and challenges the search waiver's authenticity, is it the cell phone owner's burden to prove the waiver was forged or the government's burden to prove the waiver was not forged under Fourth Amendment?

d. Where the government fails to provide the original waiver for forensic examination upon demand and the cell phone owner denies signing any waiver and challenges the search waiver's authenticity, does the government meet its burden to show that the consent was freely/voluntarily and knowledgeably given?

e. Does a waiver, granting the government consent to search a crime victim's cell phone for information "related to the case," including "text messages, photographs, videos, messages, [and] emails," grant consent to make a digital duplication of all data contained on the cell phone?

Fourth Amendment protects possessory interest even absent liberty or privacy interests. Soldal v. Cook Cty., Ill., 506 U.S. 56, 65-66 (1992). "The power to exclude has traditionally been considered one of the most treasured strands in an owner's bundle of property rights." Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 435 (1982). "A 'seizure' of property occurs when there is some meaningful interference with an individual's possessory interests in that property." United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984). "Modern cell phones are not just another technological convenience. With all they contain and all they may reveal, they hold for many Americans the privacies of life." Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 403 (2014). Individuals have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the contents of their cell phones under the Fourth Amendment due to the large amount of personal data stored therein. Id. 397-399.

The questions presented are:

a. Does digital duplication of the data contained on a cell phone interfere with the cell phone owner's possessory interest in that data by depriving the owner

When a crime victim's cell phone is searched, what is the scope of consent?