The questions for this Court are:

1. How is the term "due care" defined for purposes of the 42 U.S.C. §9607(b)(3) "third-party defense" in relation to "reasonable steps" in the substantially similar "innocent contiguous landowner defense" of 42 U.S.C. §9607(q). In other words, can two substantially similar statutory defenses have widely disparate standards of care?

2. Is an intragovernmental real estate transaction strictly for budgetary purposes a transaction contemplated by the 42 U.S.C. §9607(q) "innocent contiguous landowner defense" resulting in the defense being lost?

3. How is the "due care" standard defined for purposes of a 42 U.S.C. §9613(f) equitable allocation under the Gore factors in light of the cross-referenced due care standards set forth in 42 U.S.C. §9607(b)(3) and 42 U.S.C. §9607(q) statutory defenses?

4. Should the standards of care in the 42 U.S.C. §9607(q) "third-party defense," the 42 U.S.C. §9607(q) "innocent contiguous landowner defense," and the 42 U.S.C. §9613(f) equitable allocation through the Gore factors, be uniform, as all three concepts are substantially similar in scope and intended result?

How is the term 'due care' defined for purposes of the 42 U.S.C. §9607(b)(3) 'third-party defense' in relation to 'reasonable steps' in the substantially similar 'innocent contiguous landowner defense' of 42 U.S.C. §9607(q)