In Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 347 (1964), this Court proscribed "unexpected and indefensible" retroactive judicial criminalization of primary conduct. Id. at 354. Field preemption is a dispositive defense to common-law liability. See Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 U.S. 312, 330 (2008). Petitioner's leading issue explores the overlap of these two doctrines, an area of vast importance to numerous preemptively regulated industries.

First Question Presented for Review:
Did Maryland's retroactive elimination of multiple field preemption defenses and imposition of absolute liability for deregulated fire safety conduct in a common law grossly negligent manslaughter prosecution violate Beckwitt's Due Process rights?

In Carmell v. Texas, 529 U.S. 513 (2000), this Court addressed retroactive reductions in the burden of proof. The secondary issue is Carmell's corollary.

Second Question Presented for Review:
Did Maryland violate Beckwitt's Due Process rights by refusing to apply established common law quantitative evidentiary sufficiency rules?

Third Question Presented for Review:
Did Maryland present ex-ante sufficient evidence?

Did Maryland's retroactive elimination of multiple field preemption defenses and imposition of absolute liability for deregulated fire safety conduct in a common law grossly negligent manslaughter prosecution violate Beckwitt's Due Process rights?