Whether a statement against penal interest—

e made by an inmate/declarant who was moved
into the cell of an inmate/informant, who was
then outfitted by correctional officials with a
hidden recording device and was directed by
state police to question the inmate/declarant
about a past criminal incident;

e and which interrogation resulted in a "dual
inculpatory" statement in which the inmate/
declarant inculpated himself and the petitioner
in that past criminal incident;

e and which statement was admitted in evidence
at petitioner's trial, with no opportunity for
petitioner to confront the inmate/declarant—

can ever qualify as a "testimonial" statement under
Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004) and its
progeny—notwithstanding Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S.
74 (1970) and Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171
(1987).

And if so, whether petitioner's confrontation rights
were violated when the Connecticut Supreme Court,
relying on Dutton and Bourjaily, ruled that such a
statement was "nontestimonial," without giving sufficient
consideration to Michigan v. Bryant, 562 U.S. 344
(2011), which holds that the "primary purpose" test of
Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813 (2006) "requires a
combined inquiry that accounts for both the declarant
and the interrogator," i.e., an inquiry that "look[s] to
all of the relevant circumstances," and that "examin|[es]
the statements and actions of all participants" to the
interrogation, including "[t]he identity of [the] interrogator, and the content and tenor of his questions."

Whether a statement against penal interest made by an inmate/declarant can qualify as a 'testimonial' statement under Crawford v. Washington