This case presents two circuit splits: one involving a public university's obligation to balance the due process rights of a student accused of sexual assault, including the right to attorney-led cross-examination of the complainant and other witnesses, with the rights of the complainant, including protecting the complainant from a generalized fear of potential trauma in a university disciplinary proceeding; and another regarding the proper pleading standard applicable to Title IX claims of sex bias in disciplinary proceedings.

The questions are —

1. Does constitutional due process require that students accused of sexual assault be permitted the opportunity for attorney-led cross-examination of their accusers during public university disciplinary proceedings?

2. Is the pleading standard for a statutory claim under Title IX, 20 U.S.C. § 1681, simply whether the facts in the complaint, taken as true, plausibly support an inference that the university discriminated against a student on the basis of sex, or must the student plead additional facts to satisfy a doctrinal test, demonstrate that sex bias is the "most plausible" inference that may be drawn from the pleaded facts, and rebut any "obvious alternative explanations" for the challenged conduct?

Does constitutional due process require that students accused of sexual assault be permitted the opportunity for attorney-led cross-examination of their accusers during public university disciplinary proceedings?