The Eighth Circuit redefined and amended Congress's lenient certificate of
appealability (COA) standard found in 28 U.S.C.§ 2253 with a more restrictive and
onerous one. As a result, the court denied a COA as to any of the 32 grounds in Mr.
Tisius's initial habeas petition, which leads to the following questions:

1. Was the denial of a COA proper when a reasonable jurist could
conclude that (1) it was improper for the jury to consider, as a
reason for death, evidence of the surviving family members pleas
for death sentences, when this Court prohibited such evidence in
Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496 (1987), Payne v. Tennessee, 501
U.S. 808 (1991), and Bosse v. Oklahoma, 580 U.S. 1 (2016), and (2)
counsel's failure to object to the victim opinion evidence therefore
was deficient performance?

2. Was the denial of a COA proper when a reasonable jurist could conclude
that the state court, in finding no conflict of interest due to counsel's flatfee arrangement of $10,000 apiece for a capital sentencing proceeding,
failed to consider what counsel failed to do and instead relied exclusively
on counsel's testimony that the flat fee did not affect their representation?

3. Was the denial of a COA proper when a reasonable jurist could
conclude that trial counsel performed deficiently by failing to
investigate and present available expert evidence establishing
statutory mitigating circumstances that were not otherwise
presented to the jury?

4. Do the Eighth Circuit's pro forma unexplained blanket denials of
COAs over previous state court dissents and dissents from federal
circuit court judges in capital habeas cases conflict with 28 U.S.C. §
2258, and this Court's decisions in Slack v. McDaniel, 539 U.S. 473
(2000), Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322 (2003), Hohn v. United
States, 524 U.S. 236 (1998), and Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880
(1983), by preventing a condemned prisoner from obtaining
meaningful appellate review on a first habeas corpus petition?

Was the denial of a COA proper?