(1) Whether the federal wire fraud statute, 18 U.S.C. 1343, as properly interpreted, can be used to charge, prosecute and punish, a wire communication acknowledged by the lower court as "purely intrastate" in nature; a transmission that never crossed any state line or otherwise entered into any channel of 'interstate or foreign commerce'. And further, whether when affirming a conviction for this "purely intrastate" wire transmission, with no federal (jurisdictional) element, the lower court violated the Commerce Clause, judicially infringing on the legislative function, in violation of the Separation of Powers;

(2) And if so, whether the defendant's conviction and continued incarceration for this "purely intrastate" wire transmission, based on an improper interpretation of 18 U.S.C. 1343, is consistent with the Due Process Clause in a manner as articulated in Fiore v. White, 532 U.S. 225-226 (2001); and if so, whether this conviction and continued incarceration constitutes a 'miscarriage of justice' as defined in Davis v. United States, 417 U.S. 333 (1974), and Whalen v. United States, 445 U.S.684, 689 (1980), remediable under the 'extraordinary circumstances' holding in Calderon v. Thompson, 523 U.S. 538, 550 (1998).

Whether the federal wire fraud statute, 18 U.S.C. 1343, can be used to charge, prosecute and punish a 'purely intrastate' wire communication