1. Did the courts below improperly construe the "notice " to the debtor
requirement of 31 U.S.C. § 3720D(b)(2) and 31 C.F.R. § 285.1 1(e)(1)
when the courts below allowed the 2019 debtor notice to be mailed to an
address which the debtor had not lived at since 2011 when the triggering
mechanisms for the garnishment was the debtor filling a 2019 IRS Form W-2
(known as the "Wage and Tax Statement") which clearly listed the debtor's
2019 home address, or in the alternative, the collector could have been
mailed the garnishment notice to the debtor's current employer who could
have forwarded it to the debtor, or in the alternative, the collector could
have emailed the notice to the debtor's email address of
johndhorton@yahoo.com which has been the same since the email
address was created in 1996?

2. Did the courts below improperly ignore the notice from the "from the head
of the executive ... agency, informing the ...[debtor of the debt]" requirement
of 31 U.S.C. § 3720D(b)(2) and 31 C.F.R. § 285.1 1(e)(1) when the courts
below allowed the fly-by-night federal contractor collection agency "Coast
Professional" to issue the pre-garnishment notice?

3. This matter is appropriate for class action status under FRCP 23 to
include all class members who are federal debtors who
under 31 U.S.C. § 3720D(b)(2) and 31 C.F.R. § 285.1 1(e)(1) did not:
-- receive the notice of garnishment at the W-2 listed address
which triggered the garnishment to include at the debtor's home
address, the debtor's employer's address or at the debtor's email
address known to the collecting federal agency, and/or,
- receive the notice of garnishment "from the head of the executive
[or other] agency..." but rather, wrongfully received the notice of
garnishment from a federal contractor collection agency which was
not authorized by statute and/or regulation and is thus invalid, null,
void and outside the scope of the law.

Did the courts below improperly construe the notice requirement of 31 U.S.C. § 3720D(b)(2) and 31 C.F.R. § 285.11(e)(1)?