This capital case, in which defense counsel's investigation and preparation for the penalty phase was grossly deficient, presents two questions concerning what is and is not a reasonable application of the prejudice standard of Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). On both questions, there are mutually inconsistent lines of authority in the Courts of Appeals, and review is called for under Supreme Court Rule 10(a):

1. Whether a state or federal habeas court may reasonably conclude that a crime is so aggravated that no mitigation could persuade even one juror to vote for a life verdict, so that ineffective assistance of counsel or other error at the penalty phase cannot be prejudicial, notwithstanding that juries regularly return life verdicts in highly aggravated cases?

2. Whether, consistent with Strickland and Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374, 393 (2005), a habeas court may require a petitioner to make a "compelling" showing of prejudice from ineffective assistance of counsel, and may find an absence of prejudice based on a reasonable likelihood that the result of the trial could have been the same even in the absence of the ineffective assistance?

Whether a state or federal habeas court may reasonably conclude that a crime is so aggravated that no mitigation could persuade even one juror to vote for a life verdict