With a statute of limitations having a rationale to shield a person from having to defend against prosecution when the ability to mount a defense degraded due to basic facts abscured or lost through the passage of time with accordence with Toussie vs. United States, 397 U.S. 112 (1970); should the same argument apply to these other non-capital offenses that have an exemption because of 18 U.S.C. §3299?

Considering that word meanings matter in accordance with Atlantic-Cleaners-and Dryers vs. United States, 286 U.S. 427 (1932); should the government consider the nuance of the grammatical semantic importance of the boolean conjunctions embedded within the statute 18 U.S.C. §3299 before depriving a defendant from a statute of limitations defense?

Differentiating from Musacchio vs. United States, 577 U.S. 237 (2016), which prohibits introduction of a statute of limitations defense for the first time on direct appeal; should the similar standard apply when omission of a statute of limitations defense was not initiated by the defendant's direction but rather a consequence of Ineffective Assistance of Counsel [28 U.S.C. §2255] aspect of Strickland vs. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), because introduction did not occur until request of collateral review?

Question not identified