1. The Panel found arguable probable cause to
arrest and prosecute petitioner for the felony of sexual
abuse in the first degree under New York law without
addressing whether under State law the arresting
officer's admitted deviations from state policy and
procedure in investigating this offense vitiated any
probable cause to arrest petitioner. Does this result
square with the Court's jurisprudence that courts must
look to the "totality of the circumstances" in assessing
probable cause and consider those facts available to the
officer at the time of the arrest and immediately before it?

2. Where the issue of a police officer's immunity
derives from a common core of operative facts so that
review of the State law claims for false arrest and
malicious prosecution is necessary to insure meaningful
review of the same federal claims, was the Panel
obligated to exercise its pendent jurisdiction to address
whether under State law the arresting officer's admitted
deviations from state policy and procedure in
investigating this offense vitiated any probable cause to
arrest petitioner?

whether-officer's-deviations-from-policy-vitiated-probable-cause