QUESTION ONE:
The circuit courts agree that a conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a) will be sustained
even if the defendant was not aware that his conduct would be perceived as
intimidating by anyone, yet the Ninth Circuit in United States v. Watson, 881 F.3d
782 (9th Cir. 2018) nevertheless determined that a conviction for violating § 2113(a)
can serve as predicate offense for the substantial sentencing enhancements under
§ 924(c).
Similarly, a conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 1951 will be sustained even if the defendant
was not aware that his conduct would place someone in fear of immediate or future
injury to the person or property of another, yet the Ninth Circuit in United States v.
Dominguez, 954 F.3d 1251 (9th Cir. 2020) nevertheless determined that a conviction
for violating § 1951 can serve as predicate offense for the substantial sentencing
enhancements under § 924(c).
The question presented is what constitutes a threat of physical force under 18 U.S.C.
§ 924(c)(3)(A), and, specifically, following Borden v. United States, 141 8. Ct. 1817
(2021), can reasonable jurists can debate whether the elements clause of § 924(c)
requires proof that when the defendant acted he knew within a practical certainty
that his conduct would be perceived as threatening by another, or is it sufficient that
a reasonable person would have perceived the defendant's conduct as communicating
a threat even if the defendant did not?

QUESTION TWO:
Does the "realistic probability" test articulated in Gonzales v. Duenas-Alvarez, 549
U.S. 183 (2007) determine the scope of a federal statute, or is it the province of
federal courts to say what federal law is?

What constitutes a threat of physical force under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3)(A)