This case is of great National and public importance as the holding of the Court of Appeals that the state family court is shiel ded from any claims by a litigant with a cognitive and hearing disability for failing to provide effective reasonable accommodations will prevent any person with a disability from challenging a local court's actions as violative of the Americans Disabilities Act (hereinafter "ADA") , thereby running afoul of the clear purpose of the ADA and this Court's decision in Tennessee v Lane , 541 U.S. 509 (2004) . The family court willfully violated the petitioner's rights to access as evidenced by the Judge's comments that : "[Y]ou're saying I'm discriminating against you because you're disabled, and what I'm saying is that as you sit here right now, there is no apparent disability. You're not in a wheelchair, you didn't come in with a cane, you don't have crutches, you don't have a brace on you. There's no physical indication that you have any disability." The record below and the respondents' own rules and procedures with respect to the provision of reasonable accommodations made clear that the actions of the family court ju dge's court attorney in denying reasonable accommodations were administrative actions and as such, could not shielded by any characterization of the doctrine of judicial immunity. Moreover, at least one circuit court has ruled differently and found a quest ion of fact on the issue of whether judicial immunity would protect a similar judicial employee since providing reasonable accommodations under the ADA is deemed an administrative and not judicial function. See Duvall v. County of Kitsap , 260 F.3d 1124 (9th Cir. 2001) . This Court must resolve the split between the circuits as to whether judicial immunity applies to a court employee's wrongful actions in denying the reasonable accommodations necessary to ensure meaningful access to the courts by persons with disabilities.

1. Whether a judicial court attorney is shielded from a claim that she violated a litigant's rights under the ADA by refusing to provide a reasonable accommodation, where the state court's own rules and procedures define the function of determining reasonable accommodations as administrative in nature and where the actual conduct of the court attorney was not part of any judicial function?

2. Whether a state court system may provide alternative accommodations to a disabled litigant which are ineffective to afford meaningful access to court proceedings and avoid a claim of disc rimination under the ADA ?

Whether a judicial court attorney is shielded from a claim that she violated a litigant's rights under the ADA by refusing to provide a reasonable accommodation