No. 21-6916

Joachim Martillo v. Twitter, Inc., et al.

Lower Court: First Circuit
Docketed: 2022-01-20
Status: Denied
Type: IFP
IFP
Tags: civil-rights common-carriage constitutional-interpretation constitutional-law due-process free-speech internet-law public-accommodation section-230
Latest Conference: 2022-03-25
Question Presented (from Petition)

1. The opinion contained in Malwarebytes v. Enigma and an obiter dictum in Biden v. Knight imply that* current- caselaw associated with 47 U.S. Code § 230 is flawed. What is the correct interpretation of § 230?

2. The Appellate Court of Zeran v. America Online, Inc. used the logical fallacy called denial of the antecedent in the interpretation of § 230. Is it allowable for a Court to use a logical fallacy in interpretation of a statute?

3. Did the Appellate Court of Zeran violate U.S. Constitution Article I Section I by interpreti ng § 230 in a way that-amounts to creating law?

4. The Intemet/WWW is a state-supported establishment that has a definite identifiable structure that can be mapped to a location feat has sublpcations all over fee planet. The Internet/WWW has premises that have buildings with grounds or appurtenances throughput the United States of America. The premises of fee Intemet/WWW may temporarily include premises of a user, whose device connects to the Intemet/WWW, Since fee 1950s the Internet/WWW, which has evolved from the ARPANET, was intended to become a place of accommodation for resource sharing. Now it is public. Is the Intemet/WWW a place of public accommodation within fee definition provided by 42 U.S. Code § 2000a?

5. Does each Defendant of fee trial court proceeding provide a place of public accommodation within the definition provided by 42 U.S. Code § 2000a?

6. Whether or not fee current caselaw associated wife § 230 is correct, does § 230 override civil rights law including 42 U.S. Code § 1981 and 42 U.S. Code § 1982?

7. Has § 230 voided practically all civil rights law?

8. Each Defendant provides a common carriage service feat hardly differs from telegraph service or telex- service, each of which is a common carriage service. § 230 says nothing about common carriage. Because fee federal* government is not regulating an Interactive Computer Service (ICS) by means of federal common carriage law, does U.S. Constitution Article VI 2 give a state fee power despite § 230 to use state common carriage law to regulate an ICS, which is a common carrier?

9. Whether or not the current caselaw associated wife § 230 is correct, does § 230 override common carriage law?

Has § 230 voided practically all common carriage law?

The district court judge did not challenge the Petitioner (Joachim) when he asserted that each Defendant was a common carrier but used an irrelevant voice precedent to assert that the Petitioner had no monetary claim under M.G.L. Chapter 159, § 1 &- § ?: Is digital personal literary property, which- a Defendant carries in the form of a post, comment, or tweet, "other property " according to M.G.L. Chapter 159, § 1?

Was the dismissal of the Petitioner 's Original Complaint an abuse of discretion?

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Question Presented (AI Summary)

Correct interpretation of 47 U.S. Code § 230

Docket Entries

2022-03-28
Petition DENIED.
2022-03-10
DISTRIBUTED for Conference of 3/25/2022.
2022-01-07
Petition for a writ of certiorari and motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis filed. (Response due February 22, 2022)

Attorneys

Joachim Martillo
Joachim Carlo Santos Martillo — Petitioner