Is the standards set forth in Smith v. Murray, 536 (1986) and Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 396 (1985) the appropriate test for appellate counsel's performance as opposed to the two-prong standard for trial counsel's performance in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984)?

Is a guilty plea valid where it is made to less than all of the elements of the offense, thereby constituting selective enforcement of criminal laws?

Can a state disenfranchise a criminal defendant of substantive rights where there is no relinquishment or abandonment of a known right?

Does a State Appellate Court's refusal to reopen a direct appeal violate Due Process where an appellant makes the proper showing of ineffective assistance of Appellate Counsel, prejudice, and that but for such ineffective assistance, there is a reasonable likelihood the outcome of the appeal would have been different, where the State Rule makes reopening mandatory upon such showing?

Does a State Trial Court violate Due Process by rendering Judgment of conviction and sentencing a defendant after the State Trial Court lost jurisdiction as a matter of State law?

Does a State Court of Appeals violate Due Process by refusing to reopen an appeal and by failing to vacate a judgment, upon where it has been shown that the Trial Court's Judgment was rendered without, and after having lost, jurisdiction?

Can a criminal Judgment be Constitutionally sustained where State law has severed and terminated, with prejudice, the Trial Court's Jurisdiction over the criminal case for lack of and the State's failure to proper notice of a pending charge, bring a matter to trial within the required statutory time limit?

Can a defendant be Constitutionally convicted of an offense that requires prior notice of a "no trespass order" where the record does not affirmatively show such notice was validly given?

Is the standards set forth in Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527, 536 (1986) and Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 396 (1985) the more appropriate test for appellate counsel's performance as opposed to the two-prong standard for trial counsel's performance in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984)?