Does our society's evolving understanding of the impact of implicit bias on jury behavior justify overturning the "substantial circumstances" test set out in Kosales-Lopez v. United States, 451 U.S. 182, 189, 192 (1981) (plurality opinion) and creating a per se rule that judges presiding over criminal cases involving alleged crimes of violence by Black men must, when asked, voir dire potential jurors about implicit bias and any unconscious preconceptions they hold about the propensity of Black men to commit violent acts?

2. Did the district court's refusal to voir dire the jury panel about implicit bias and any unconscious preconceptions they hold about the propensity of Black men to commit violent acts constitute a violation of the Petitioner's Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury?

Does our society's evolving understanding of the impact of implicit bias on jury behavior justify overturning the 'substantial circumstances' test