In a murder case, may a defendant's inherently assaultive felonious conduct - ie, the use of a knife for the purpose of unreasonagle self-defense - afford a gasis for a sun suponte instruction on the lesser-included offence of invouluntary manslaughter, when there is substantial trial evidence that the defendant used the knife intending to keep a rapidly-approaching attacker (the victim) at bay but not intending to hit the attacker with the knife, and the defendant's failure to exercise "due caution and circumspection" resulted in an unintended, single, fatal knife wound?

2. In a murder case, does prejudicial, reversible error necessarily result from a trial court's failure to instruct sua sponte a jury on how to consider the mental state of a defendant who exhibits the absence of malice via a lack of "due caution and cicumspection" (criminal negligence) - when supported by substantia! trial evidence - as an intermediate mental state (supporting a conviction for invoulntary manslaughter) between malice aforethought (supporting a conviction for murder) and actual innocence (supporting acquittal of murder)?

3. Did the trial court prejudicially violate petitioner's Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights by failing to instruct sua sponte the jury on the lesser - included offense of invouluntary manslaughter based on a petitioner's criminal negligence, which instruction was supported by substantial trial evidence?

4. Were petitioner's federal - due - process rights voilated because there was insufficient evidence to support a jury finding of deliberation and premeditation as to the murder charge?

Whether a defendant's use of a knife for the purpose of unreasonable self-defense can support a jury instruction on the lesser-included offense of involuntary manslaughter