Mr.Morin alleges that the district court erred by mischaracterizing
• statements from a non-testifying witness, resulting in severe prejudice
against him. Mr.Morin was convicted, in large part, as a result of.this
misclassification . Because of this mischaracterization , Mr.Morin was
denied the ability to confront a key witness against him. This error
created a distinct slant in the weight of evidence against him. This
case thus presents the following question.

Would a reasonable jurist find error in the District Court's assessment
that hearsay statement in the case at bar was "non testimonial" according
to the standard established in Crawford v. Washington ?

Mr.Morin alleges that photos shown to the jury, contrary to the trial
and district court determination, were more prejudicial than probative,
that they served no legitimate purpose in the proving of guilt. Mr.Morin
further alleges that the trial court abused it's discretion by allowing
the photos to be shown to the jury, as they served not to establish guilt,
but only to excite emotion. This case presents the following question.

Would a reasonable jurist find error in the District Court's determination
that photographs shown to the jury were more probative than prejudicial
violating Morin's right to fundamental fairness?

Mr.Morin alleges that his trial counsel was ineffective because he failed
to investigate potentially exculpatory evidence that may have had a
mitigating effect. This error may have had an adverse effect on the
trial because it speaks directly to the credibility of the state's key
witness. This case thus presents the following question.

Having reviewed the evidence, could reasonable jurists find trial counsel
ineffective for not investigating possible exculpatory impeachment
evidence included in the State's Brady Disclosure?

Would a reasonable jurist find error in the District Court's assessment that hearsay statement in the case at bar was 'non testimonial' according to the standard established in Crawford v. Washington?