Does enjoining both courts in contradictory reliance on faux removal of a 100% exempt parcel (11 U.S.C.) revested in Petitioner before removal from the state's in rem petition, forever seal the fate, post-repose, of all Respondents' inactions and actions forever thereafter, as being absolutely moot; unlabeled as either a "tax case" or a "bankruptcy case" by exemption, followed by repose set in state law, to give Petitioner federal subject-matter jurisdiction in addition to what she had, since Monroe v. Pape (1961), August 29, 2019?

Does the Michigan v. Long misuse of federal law by Respondents Yun, on behalf of Sabree, creating faux removal, revealed by Kilpatrick, give this Court a perfect vehicle to extend Michigan v. Long's application to civil matters that hoard all excess profit which a trustee liquidation would make available to Debtor and other creditors, such that Sabree "walked in the shoes" of the trustee in a state court, which Kilpatrick, in January 2017, told Petitioner "survive the bankruptcy"; declared August 7, 2017 it did not; Sabree reversed it, invoking by preemption in 2019, Knick v. Township of Scott, Pennsylvania, which cited Monroe v. Pape (1961)?

Does enjoining both courts in contradictory reliance on faux removal of a 100% exempt parcel (11 U.S.C.) revested in Petitioner before removal from the state's in rem petition, forever seal the fate, post-repose, of all Respondents' inactions and actions forever thereafter, as being absolutely moot; unlabeled as either a 'tax case' or a 'bankruptcy case' by exemption, followed by repose set in state law, to give Petitioner federal subject-matter jurisdiction in addition to what she had, since Monroe v. Pape (1961), August 29, 2019?