1. Given that this Court held in Slack v. McDanie l, 529 US 473 (2000) that a Certificate of Appealability ("COA") shall not be granted if "no reasonable jurist" could find the court's decisions "debatable or wrong" (id at 484), was it an improper abuse of discretion for the District Court and the Court of Appeals to deny the Petitioner a COA without explanation or opinion (but for the boilerplate assertion that no reasonable jurist could find the Court's decision wrong or debatable, a'la Slack), despite the fact that the record of the case and the pleadings to the Court of Appeals contained two (2) seperate affidavits from a "reasonable jurist —"who specifically testified under oath that the lower court's rulings in the case were "wrong or debatable"?
2. Did the Trial and Appellate Courts err by supplanting thier own, subjec tive opinion of what a "reasonable jurist" would find debatable or wrong under Slack , instead of applying the Slack standard objectively and given the fact that there were two (2) affidavits from a reasonable jurist who found the Trial Court's decisions "erong or debatable", or, in other words, is the "reasonable jurist" standard in Slack a subjective one wherein the Court solely decides what a reasonable jurist would think (or even who qualifies as a reasonable jurist), or was the Supreme Court's holding in Slack that a reasonable jurist is (or can be) an objective standard that can be met by a petitioner presenting sworn testimony or a verified affidavit from a reasonable jurist stating that the decision(s) of the lower court(s) were wrong or debatable?
3. Given the fact that many of the assertions and claims by Mr. Bates in his §2255 were based on facts either not reflected in the record, or so minimally so that the record can cast no real light, did the Court err by failing to grant Mr. Bates evidentary hearings (which he moved for repeatedly without opposition from the Government) to expand the record as required by previous Supreme Court and Eleventh Circuit precedent, and then make a ruling on these matters despite there being nothing on the record to reflect these issues? ?r, more specifically, did the Court's denial of evidentary hearings leave the record so befift of evidence on matters occurring outside the record (ie: incidents that happened outside the courtroom, post-trial, or newly discovered evidence or facts) allow the Court to deny Mr. Bates a C.O.A. without sufficient evidence or facts on the record to make a sound decision?
Whether the lower court erred in dismissing petitioner's claims for violation of their First Amendment rights to free speech and free exercise of religion