I. Petitioner pointed to the Government agent's testimony about his "recruitment"
role and activities for co-defendant Patrick Stein, and admitted testimony from two
witnesses about his positive relationships with members of a criminal conspiracy's
target class. Was the quantum and character of this evidence in the record
sufficient to entitle him to a jury instruction on entrapment?

II. The District Court used a process for determining admissibility of co-conspirator
statements against Petitioner in which it: accepted the Government's proffer, alone,
and over Petitioner's objection, as the manner-of-proof for preliminary Rule
questions; and utilized a variation on the narrative approach expressly rejected by
this Court in Williamson v. United States. Did the District Court's process violate
Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2)(E)?

III. The District Court specifically found that there was no evidence supporting the
materiality element of Petitioner's 18 U.S.C. § 1001(a)(2) but permitted the question
to go to the jury anyway. Does due process require the record to reflect evidence of
materiality in order to sustain an 18 U.S.C. § 1001(a)(2) conviction when false
statements are given to FBI investigators?

Was the quantum and character of this evidence in the record sufficient to entitle him to a jury instruction on entrapment?