1. Whether in 42 U.S.C. § 1983 proceedings, when the pro se litigant initially only
argued his property interest in the complaint and then claimed with
developed argumentation in the motion for reconsideration that he was also
deprived of a liberty interest, the liberty interest claim should be considered
properly preserved for appeal, rather than "raised for the first time on
appeal ".

2. Whether a "Rent Administrator 's Order determining the rent overcharge amount
and penalties ", which under New York state law is actually an enforceable
judgment, also constitutes "property " within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

3. Whether the same set of alleged facts which was considered by the lower courts
for the petitioner 's procedural due process claim should have been considered
for the petitioner 's equal protection and substantive due process claims as
well, in light of the circumstances of this case and the rulings established in
Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954); and Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558
(2003) ("the concepts of equal protection and due process are not mutually
exclusive "; ''discrimination may be so unjustifiable as to be violative of due
process "; "equality of treatment and the due process right to demand respect
for conduct protected by the substantive guarantee of liberty are linked in
important respects, and a decision on the latter point advances botho
interests. ")

Whether a liberty interest claim was properly preserved for appeal