1. Whether the Fourth Circuit erred in concluding
that a conviction for South Carolina carjacking, S.C.
Code § 16-3-1075, is categorically a crime of violence
under the force clause of the Armed Career Criminal
Act, 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)G), where the state carjacking statute, on its face, criminalizes taking a vehicle by "by force and violence or by intimidation."

2. Whether the Fourth Circuit, departing from
this Court's instructions that the categorical approach focuses on the usual and customary meaning
of a statute's plain text, erred in placing improper
weight on Petitioner's failure to identify "actual
cases" demonstrating nonviolent applications of
South Carolina's carjacking statute—even though the
South Carolina statute, on its face, criminalizes acts
of "intimidation" that are not necessarily violent.

Whether the Fourth Circuit erred in concluding that a conviction for South Carolina carjacking is categorically a crime of violence under the Armed Career Criminal Act