Hanna Karcho Polselli, et al. v. Internal Revenue Service
The Internal Revenue Code generally requires the
IRS, when it serves a summons on a third-party
recordkeeper for records pertaining to a person "identified in the summons," to give that identified person
notice of the summons. I.R.C. § 7609(a)(1). If the IRS
issues a summons directing a bank to produce an accountholder's records, for example, it must generally
notify that accountholder of the summons. Section
7609 then provides that "any person who is entitled to
notice of a summons under subsection (a) shall have
the right to begin a proceeding to quash" that summons in district court. Id. § 7609(b)(2); see id.
§ 7609(h)(1). In other words, only a person entitled to
notice of a summons can seek judicial review of that
summons.
There are a few exceptions to the notice requirement. As relevant here, the IRS need not provide
notice of "any summons ... issued in aid of the collection of (i) an assessment made or judgment rendered
against the person with respect to whose liability the
summons is issued; or (11) the liability at law or in equity of any transferee or fiduciary of any person
referred to in clause (i)." Id. § 7609(c)(2)(D).
The question presented is whether' the
§ 7609(c)(2)(D)(i) exception applies only when the delinquent taxpayer owns or has a legal interest in the
summonsed records (as the Ninth Circuit holds), or
whether the exception applies to a summons for anyone's records whenever the IRS thinks that person's
records might somehow help it collect a delinquent
taxpayer's liability (as the Sixth Circuit, joining the
Seventh Circuit, held below).
Whether the § 7609(c)(2)(D)(i) exception to the IRS summons notice requirement applies only when the summonsed records belong to the delinquent taxpayer, or whether it applies more broadly