1. When the unconstitutionality of an officer's conduct is obvious, must the court, in addressing the "clearly established law" prong of a qualified immunity defense under the Fourth Amendment, analyze whether there are reasons, separate and apart from factually analogous precedent, why a reasonable officer could still have "fair notice" that his actions are unconstitutional, taking into account the "totality of the circumstances" confronted by the officer?

2. In addressing the touchstone question of whether prior precedent can give "fair notice" to an officer that his conduct is unconstitutional, is it proper for the court to limit its inquiry to the moment deadly force was used without considering whether a prior warning was "feasible" during a time when the suspect did not pose an immediate threat of harm to the officer or others?

3. In a case involving the use of deadly force against an armed suspect, does the Eleventh Circuit's holding that—in order to reach the level of "fair notice" required to defeat an officer's qualified immunity—prior precedent must clearly establish that a warning must be given "at the earliest possible time" conflict with this Court's precedent in Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985) that a warning is required where it was feasible to do so?

When the unconstitutionality of an officer's conduct is obvious, must the court, in addressing the 'clearly established law' prong of a qualified immunity defense under the Fourth Amendment, analyze whether there are reasons, separate and apart from factually analogous precedent, why a reasonable officer could still have 'fair notice' that his actions are unconstitutional, taking into account the 'totality of the circumstances' confronted by the officer?