Whether a government agency like the National Labor Relations Board has absolute discretion in all of its non-enforcement decisions and thus such decisions are never subject to judicial review (as the 2nd Circuit has just affirmed in my situation) or that there is not absolute discretion in every non-enforcement decision and thus it is possible that there would be exceptions, such as in my situation, in which there is judicial review, as the 9th Circuit held in Montana Air Chapter No. 29 v. FLRA, 898 F.2d 753 (9th Cir. 1990 and in International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers v. A Lubbers, 681 F.2d 598 (9th Cir. 1982) - in accordance with the U.S. Supreme Court in Leedom v. Kyne, 358 U.S. 184, 79 S.Ct 180, 3 L.Ed.2d 210 (1958), Rochester Telephone Corp. v. United States, 307 U.S. 125, 143 (1939), and Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821 (1985).

In Wolin v. Port of New York Authority, 392 F.2d 83 (2d Cir. 1968), the Second Circuit held of the applicability of the First Amendment with regard to the Port of New York Authority (Note: "cert, denied 393 U.S. 940, 89 S.Ct. 290, 21 L.Ed.2d 275 (1968)" ) stating that "the Terminal is dedicated to the public use, to no less a degree than the streets of a company owned town, Marsh v. State of Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 66 S.Ct. 276, 90 L.Ed. 265 (1946) " and yet, in my situation, the Second Circuit affirmed the U.S. District Court not applying the First Amendment with regard to the Brooklyn Public Library - in contradiction to the U.S. Supreme Court decision of Marsh v. State of Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 66 S.Ct. 276, 90 L.Ed. 265 (1946).

The U.S. District Court (EDNY) and the Second Circuit never provided me with an opportunity to amend or supplement any of my complaints even though I am a pro se litigant diagnosed as disabled; is the refusal to grant me such an opportunity acceptable?

After U.S. District Court Judge Townes passed away, my cases were assigned to U.S. District Court Judge Kuntz; unlike Judge Townes, when Judge Kuntz granted my adversaries dismissals of the remaining complaints, Judge Kuntz wrote "NOT FOR PUBLICATION " [Emphasis in the original]. In addition, when the Second Circuit affirmed the dismissals via Summary Order it stated "RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT " [Emphasis in the original]. Does this sound like the Second Circuit followed the law, did not follow the law, and/or even knows what the law is - as Justice Marshall warned in Heckler?

Whether a government agency has absolute discretion in non-enforcement decisions