Is materiality an element of all claims brought under 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)(A) when neither the common law nor the text of the statute support such a requirement for claims based on factually false statements?

On a motion to dismiss, can the Government's continued payment of claims despite actual knowledge of a defendant's noncompliance be dispositive of materiality when a relator's well-pleaded factual allegations support at least two materiality factors, and there are other plausible reasons that the Government continued payment?

Is a relator permitted to plead a reverse false claim under 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)(G) as an alternative to a traditional false claim under § 3729(a)(1)(A) when a relator alleges that the defendant has a separate obligation to return money or property to the Government?

Is materiality an element of all claims brought under 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)(A)