This case presents a clear and intractable conflict regarding an important statutory question under the Speedy Trial Act of 1974, 18 U.S.C. 3161 et seq. Under the Act, the government is required to file an information or indictment within thirty days of an individual's arrest. But the Act stops the clock for specified "periods of delay," including for certain continuances—"if the judge granted such continuance on the basis of his findings that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial." The Act further specifies that "[n]o such period of delay * * * shall be excludable * * * unless the court sets forth, in the record of the case, either orally or in writing, its reasons for finding that the ends of justice [were] served." 18 U.S.C. 3161(h)(7)(A).

In the proceedings below, a district judge granted multiple continuances without making any "ends of justice" findings. When petitioner moved under the Act to dismiss, a different judge denied the motion, supplying the requisite findings that the first judge failed to make. The First Circuit, like the Fifth Circuit, held that those post-hoc findings by a different judge satisfied the Act's "on-the-record" requirement. That holding is directly contrary to settled law in the Fourth and Ninth Circuits. The question presented is:

1. Under the Speedy Trial Act, if one judge grants an "ends of justice" continuance but fails to explain why, whether a different judge can make the requisite findings to support the continuance.

2. Whether, when confronted with specific allegations supporting judicial disclosure and disqualification, a district court exceeds its discretion by denying a disqualification motion without any explanation or disclosure necessary to facilitate meaningful appellate review.

Whether a different judge can make the requisite 'ends of justice' findings to support a continuance under the Speedy Trial Act