1. Should the "Inextricably Intertwined" doctrine be
abolished because it violates the due process clause of the
14th Amendment since it is unconstitutionally vague, not fact based, subjective and arbitrary and its application illegally displaces the Ninth Circuit's own Janjua v.
Neufeld 933 F.3d 1061, 1065 (9th Cir. 2019) Issue Preclusion
test that is mandated to be employed in Rooker-Feldman doctrine cases by the Supreme Court's decision in Exxon
Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp. 544 U.S. 280, 284
(2005) and for its rationale of denying Federal jurisdiction by outlawing this fraud case simply because it naturally has to include some of the damages which were sought in the underlying case even though the Parties, the fraud legal theory and the statutory remedy sought in this case are different than the Parties, the legal theory and the statutory remedy in the underlying case plus this case cannot overturn or affect the underlying case in any way?

2. Should Federal subject matter jurisdiction be
granted in an Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA") case which alleges that a plaintiff was fraudulently deprived of his Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial?

3. In an ADA case in which a fraud victim was deprived
of a Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial, is he entitled to have a jury trial in Federal Court because only a jury can make the finding of fact, after listening to all of the evidence, that fraud has been committed?

4. Should the Supreme Court grant Federal subject
matter jurisdiction and set aside and vacate the judgment in this case and remand this case to the Ninth Circuit to
allow Petitioner to move forward with this case and at the
same time keep the First Amendment litigation privilege intact by not protecting in-court speech made by attorneys to the Trial Court regarding how they fulfilled their mandatory statutory duties during settlement contract formation required by Cal. Civ. Code §§ 1565(3) and 1585
because the fulfillment of these regular duties cannot be deemed to be advocating for a client's case and which will assure that the victim's attorney will not be vulnerable to a malicious prosecution lawsuit if the case fails and a plaintiff who alleges fraud caused by this in-court speech will not have to represent himself in Pro Se nor will it affect the underlying Appellate decision in any way by making the following ruling:
The First Amendment litigation privilege does not protect in-court representations made by attorneys to a Trial Court which are made to reveal how they complied with their required mandated statutory duties during settlement contract formation?

5. Should the First Amendment litigation privilege not
protect in-court "malice" speech as defined in Cal. Civ. Code § 47(c) when there is an allegation in a complaint that
the attorney-defendants deprived a victim of his Seventh Amendment constitutional right to a jury trial by their fraudulent in-court speech to the Trial Court in response to questioning about their fulfillment of their mandatory statutory duties during settlement contract formation which cannot be classified as "advocacy" as a matter of law to shield a victim's attorney from being subject to a malicious prosecution lawsuit if the case fails and the victim will not be forced to have to represent himself in Pro Se which is a major disadvantage.

6. Should a three judge Federal Appeals Panel, to
prevent its rulings from being unconstitutionally vague,
be required to

Should the 'Inextricably Intertwined' doctrine be abolished?