1. Does the "refuses to operate " clause under the Surface Transportation Assistance
Act ("STAA ") afford protection to employees who refuse to commit unsafe acts
while in their operation of vehicles (as held by the Tenth Circuit), or is the
protection afforded solely to employees who refuse to drive vehicles either
because of the vehicle 's hazardous condition or the driver has a reasonable
apprehension of accident of injury (as held by Eighth Circuit)?

2. Did Congress intend for state administrative findings that are not reviewed to be
afforded issue preclusion effect in federal proceedings involving discrimination
claims brought under the STAA?

3. Did the lower courts grossly misapply the substantial evidence standard in this
case?

Does the 'refuses to operate' clause under the Surface Transportation Assistance Act afford protection to employees who refuse to commit unsafe acts while in their operation of vehicles, or is the protection afforded solely to employees who refuse to drive vehicles either because of the vehicle's hazardous condition or the driver has a reasonable apprehension of accident of injury?