In Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530, 92 S. Ct. 2182, 2192, 33 L. Ed. 2d 101 (1972), this Court held that a period of delay from indictment to trial, at some point, becomes "presumptively prejudicial" for purposes of triggering a constitutional speedy trial analysis. In Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647, 652, 112 S. Ct. 2686, 2691, 120 L. Ed. 2d 520 (1992), the Court cited with approval lower court decisions providing that a delay of one year or more meets the "presumptively prejudicial" threshold. Is the threshold for presumptive prejudice modified by delay not attributable to the United States, or is it a calendar calculation?

In United States v. Tinklenberg, 563 U.S. 647, 131 8. Ct. 2007, 179 L. Ed. 2d 1080 (2011), this Court held that filing any pretrial motion tolls the Speedy Trial Act clock, regardless of the nature of the motion, and whether or not the motion causes delay. The question presented in this case is: once a pretrial motion is filed, does a district court have unlimited time to resolve that motion?

Is the threshold for presumptive prejudice modified by delay not attributable to the United States, or is it a calendar calculation?