1: Are New York State's procedural rules insufficiently hospitable to a Petitioner's constitutional claims such as here where the Petitioner was deemed to be procedurally defaulted from raising claims on direct appeal due to the ineffectiveness of appellate counsel?

2. Does New York's procedural default rules embodied in CPL 440.10[2][c] & [3][a] violate the substantive due process rights of appellants (both on their face and as applied)?

3. Is it a conflict of interest resulting in the loss of due process and/or judicial neutrality when the same trial judge who served as both witness of witnesses and a participant in the trial leading to conviction then serves as fact-finder and decision-maker in post-conviction procedures in evaluating the trial for error including those attributed to the judge or a product of his agency?

4. Is it a violation of the fundamental fairness represented by due process when a judge, fully aware that all pre- and mid-trial plea-offerings were for probation or conditional discharge, then sentenced the Petitioner to a seven-year prison term plus ten years of probation?

5. Is it a constitutional violation of due process and/or of equal protection that amounts to punishing a criminal defendant for his claim of innocence or the assertion of his trial rights for a judge when setting sentencing decisions to consider and/or base his sentencing decisions on the articulated trial inconveniences/burdens of crime victims?

6. Was the Petitioner subjected to cruel and unusual punishment when while still asserting his innocence he was sentenced to seven years in prison plus ten years probation after numerous cries - including from state agents in police and probation - to punish him for asserting his trial rights after rejecting pre- and mid-trial pleas that subjected him only to probation and/or conditional discharge if he would plead guilty? Is the imprisonment of sex offenders to prison terms or lengthy prison terms cruel or unusual punishment; or — when considering the severe social stigma prevalent in our culture against sex offenses and their perpetrators - is subjecting sex offender to plea-deals that require public admissions of guilt considered a cruel punishment in violation of the shaming practices that the Eighth Amendment and the first Congress sought to eradicate?

7. Did the State's imposition of a plea-bargaining system (i.e. the State's judicial and prosecutorial agent's pressured expectation that Petitioner participate in plea bargaining coupled with an alleged threats and a retaliatory sentence for asserting his trial rights) violate or subject the Petitioner to a reduction of the privileges and immunities — and specifically 5th and 6th Amendment trial rights — guaranteed him under the 14th Amendment?

8. Was probable cause thereby rebutted and negated such that both indictment and conviction should have been vacated when police agent and arresting officer both admit in their trial testimony to the use of fraud in the "control call" used to indict and convict petitioner, and when law enforcement withheld exculpatory BRADY materials from the Prosecutor?

9. Did the fraudulent nature of the control call conducted by the State police sufficiently counteract the one-party consent rule such that the control call amounted to an unreasonable search, operating without a warrant, in violation of the Petitioner's Fourth Amendment rights?

10. Does the relationship of the parties in a phone call amount to a co-tenancy relationship akin to that recognized in GEORGIA V. RANDOLPH, 547 US 303 (2006), such that it is unconstitutional for one party to a phone call to consent to a warrantless police interception

Are New York's procedural rules insufficiently hospitable to constitutional claims?