1. WHETHER THE PRINCIPLES OF DUE PROCESS ARE OFFENDED BY THE LOWER COURTS' APPLICATION OF AN INCORRECT LEGAL STANDARD IN ASSESSING THE PETITIONER'S ACTUAL INNOCENCE CLAIM —AS ENUNCIATED BY MCOUIGGIN V. PERKINS. 133 S. CT. 1924 (2013); MURRAYV. CARRIER . 477 U.S. 478 (1986), SCHLUP V. DELO , 513 U.S. 298 (1995); AND BOUSLEY V. UNITED STATES , 523 U.S. 614 (1998) —WHERE THE DECISION CONFLICTS WITH FEDERAL LAWS ON FUNDAMENTAL CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES AND FEDERAL LAW?

2. WHETHER UNDER THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE, A MISCARRIAGE OF JUSTICE OCCURS WHEN THE PETITIONER IS CONVICTED FOR A NON-EXISTENT OFFENSE OR AN OFFENSE NOT KNOWN TO THE LAW BUT THE COURT FAILS TO ADDRESS THE CLAIM?

3. WHETHER, UNDER THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE, A MISCARRIAGE OF JUSTICE OCCURS AFTER THE DISTRICT COURT RULES THAT THE PETTIONER'S ACTUAL INNOCENCE CLAIM HAD NEVER BEEN ADDRESSED ON THE MERITS, BUT THEN DENIES THE PETITION AS AN ATTEMPT TO RE-LITIGATE CONVICTIONS AND/OR AS AN UNAUTHORIZE ATTEMPT TO USE THE WRIT OF ERROR CORAM NOBIS AS A VEfflCLE, WHICH EXPRESSLY CONFLICTS WITH DECISIONS OF THIS COURT AND ITS OWN PRECEDENTS IN UNITED STATES V. MORGAN . 346 U.S. 502 (1954) AND UNITED STATES V. MILLS . 221 F. 3d 1201 (11th CIR. 2000)?

Whether the principles of due process are offended