This case provides this Court with multiple instances for it to ground the criteria by which presiding judges, with different active relationships with a named-party university, may rule over a case involving that university, without violating 28 U.S.C. § 455 and/or the Due Process Clauses of the United States Constitution. It also allows the Court to determine whether interlocutory mandamus is appropriate when a presiding judge denies a motion to disqualify and the appellate court does not substantively address whether the judge erred in denying disqualification.

The presiding District Court Judge, despite stating he "ha[s] and will continue to ... serv[e], teach [for], and hir[e] students [from] " the named-Defendant university, denied the motion to recuse/disqualify himself from this case. His predecessor District Judge was a paid-employee teacher of the named-Defendant while presiding, never so disclosed, and recused himself after almost three and a half years of actively presiding, simply stating "[f]or good cause appearing, " and ruling his university 's teachers could not be held individually liable for defamation, as it is within their scope of employment. The current presiding District Court Judge, also a teacher at the same university, refused to reconsider any of the recused judge 's orders or even hold a post-recusal status hearing to discuss the extraordinary recusal of his colleague.

1. Whether a presiding judge must recuse/ disqualify themselves, under 28 U.S.C. § 455, and/or the Due Process Clauses of the US Constitution, when / the judge has active teaching ties with a named-party university before him/her, and at issue are the university teacher 's scope of employment and individual liability.

2. Whether interlocutory mandamus is appropriate when presiding judges do not voluntarily disclose their active relationship(s) with a named-party before them.

Whether a presiding judge must recuse/disqualify themselves when the judge has active teaching ties with a named-party university