Is New Jersey's "cyber-harassment" statute, N.J.S.A. 2C:33-4.1, constitutionally invalid because it lacks a scienter requirement and relies on a "reasonable person" standard which dilutes the burden of proof and violates due process in the wake of Elonis v. United States, 575 U.S. 723 (2015)?

Is New Jersey's "cyber-harassment" statute constitutionally invalid for being "overbroad" and "void-for-vagueness" because of statutorily undefined terms proscribing "lewd, indecent, and obscene material" and the causing of "emotional harm" that are impermissibly vague and criminalize too wide a swath of protected expression?

What is the definition of "lewd, indecent, and obscene material" and the boundaries of obscenity in the internet age? Could this specific statutory language in a state criminal statute survive free speech and due process scrutiny given this Court's holdings in FCC v. Fox, 556 U.S. 502 (2009), Reno v. ACLU, 524 U.S. 844 (1997), and Sable Communications v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115 (1989)?

Is the publishing online of libellous material directed to the general public that neither directly harasses the victims so libelled or makes any threatening communication "protected expression"? How does the publishing of said libellous material as a public blog post online differ from a printed flier, a tell-all book, or other protected media, to permit the State of New Jersey to criminalize it chiefly because it is an online utterance? Cf. Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 502 (1952).

If a defendant facing sentencing is not provided with "victim impact statements" to either review himself and/or with counsel before sentencing but then those same victim impact statements are subsequently read several times and heavily considered by the sentencing judge, is this defendant denied a meaningful opportunity to allocate or confront the material pursuant to the protections of the Due Process and Confrontation clauses?

Is New Jersey's 'cyber-harassment' statute constitutionally invalid?